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JOHN HORGAN
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This article presents an empirical analysis of a unique dataset of 1240 former
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). We highlight the shift-
ing sociological and operational profile of PIRA’s cadre, and highlight these dynam-
ics in conjunction with primary PIRA documents and secondary interview sources.
The effect of these changes in terms of the scale and intensity of PIRA violence is also
considered. Although this is primarily a study of a disbanded violent organization, it
contains broad policy implications beyond the contemporary violence of dissident
movements in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. We conclude with
a consideration of how a shifting sociological profile impacts upon group effective-
ness, resilience, homogeneity, and the turn toward peaceful means of contention.
Keywords IRA, profile, terrorism, terrorist
Introduction
John Whyte famously wrote that Northern Ireland ‘‘is the most heavily researched
area on earth.’’2 It may be surprising that yet more research on Northern Ireland,
especially on the Irish Republican Army, could possibly offer a substantial contri-
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bution to the heaving literature that already exists on ‘‘The Troubles.’’ The worrying
rise in contemporary dissident terrorist activity in Northern Ireland provides the con-
text for many of the recent examinations of those particular groups.3 Yet curiously
absent from much of the astonishing array of literature on Irish Republicanism are
empirical, data-driven perspectives of those who engaged in non-state paramilitary
activity throughout the Troubles. There are notable exceptions4 of course, but by
and large empirical analyses of political violence in Northern Ireland at the individual
level have been scarce, a point reflected in the broader terrorism studies and civil war
literature, at least until recently.
Fortunately, however, in recent times many individual-level analyses that
were characterized by a preoccupation with such notions as ‘‘predispositions’’ for
involvement have given way to more promising avenues for examining the activity of
those individuals who became involved in terrorism. These include studies on al-Qaeda,
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), foreign fighters in Iraq, and Colombian, Pakistani,
Palestinian, and South-East Asian militants.5 Collectively, such approaches provide
an empirical basis for hypothesis testing about those who join terrorist movements such
as when, where, and how they became involved, the activities they took part in, how
they fit into a wider networked structure, and how they ultimately disengaged.
In this article, we hope to contribute towards this development by offering an
account of the shifting sociological and operational profile of Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) members between 1970 and 1998. The analysis presented
here is drawn from a new dataset of 1240 PIRA members, developed as part of a larger
research effort on malevolent creativity and innovation in terrorist networks. The
database includes thirty-nine variables across temporal, socio-demographic, and oper-
ational domains. The relatively large time frame (almost 30 years) under consideration
allows us to use a time-series analysis to examine variations across age, location, roles,
employment status, and other variables. We can place such changes against the shifting
organizational structure and the dominant strategic and tactical logic of the PIRA over
time. Changes in environmental conditions such as the changing nature of Britain’s
counter-terrorism policy also impact upon these changes within PIRA. Using the data
as a starting point, our analysis is complemented by additional insights from seminal
studies on PIRAhistory, primary source PIRAdocuments, and secondary interview data
to help explain these shifts. With the exception of Reinares’ research on ETA,6 efforts to
engage in such endeavors through triangulated methods remain relatively unexplored.
A Brief History of the IRA
PIRA was formed in December 1969 as a breakaway movement from the older,
original Irish Republican Army. The 1969 split gave rise to both PIRA and a group
calling itself the Official IRA (OIRA). One7 catalyst for the split was an internal
disagreement among Irish Republican militants about the appropriate response
(e.g., violent vs. non-violent) to widespread resistance and intimidation against
Catholics in Northern Ireland, set against a backdrop of a developing Civil Rights
movement within Northern Ireland seeking social and economic parity for Catholics
with their Protestant neighbors. OIRA on the other hand are largely depicted as rivals
having a Dublin-based and Marxist-inspired leadership who were more interested in
taking a laissez-faire approach—aiming instead to unify Catholic and Protestant
working classes. While not entirely without its merits, this depiction overlooks the
fact that OIRA engaged in a military campaign until May 1972 and actively recruited
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personnel in competition with PIRA. PIRA framed themselves as defenders of the
Catholic communities under threat by sectarian Loyalist mobs (often passively or
actively supported by the local police force—the Royal Ulster Constabulary) who
had attacked Civil Rights marchers, Catholic-owned businesses, and Catholic hous-
ing estates that drove thousands from their homes. While these dynamics and others
have been captured in seminal historical accounts8 and firsthand accounts by disen-
gaged militants,9 there remain few adequate accounts of who joined PIRA that go
beyond personal recollections and largely anecdotal description.10
To provide an account of the recruitment patterns and operational profiles
amongst PIRA members, this article disaggregates PIRA’s campaign into five discrete
phases of activity. The first phase covers 1969–1976. Over the course of this period,
PIRA structured themselves like an Army with various brigades, battalions, and com-
panies. Each unit was responsible for specific geographical combat areas. Indiscriminate
violence by all sides of the conflict marked this period, the most defining moment of
which was ‘‘Bloody Sunday’’ when the British Army shot and killed thirteen innocent
civil rights marchers. This was an unprecedented propaganda coup for PIRA and led
tomass recruitment andmobilization. Civilian fatalities attributed to PIRA also peaked
during this phase and included the events of ‘‘Bloody Friday’’ where, in the space of
under two hours, 22 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) killed 9 (6 civilians, 2 British
Soldiers, and 1 member of the Ulster Defence Association) and injured a further 130.
1977–1980 covers the second phase and is significant for a number of reasons.
First, there was a large-scale re-organization of PIRA’s structure to a tighter,
cellular-based network in which cells acted independently of one another. This
change placed far less emphasis on the quantity of Volunteers and far more emphasis
on secrecy and discipline. Almost instantly, the effects of the structural changes were
noticeable. 465 fewer charges for paramilitary offences occurred within a year.11
Second, a number of leadership changes occurred whereby younger Northern born
and bred members such as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness who respectively
became PIRA Chiefs of Staff in 1977 and 1979 took charge.12 This largely came
about through the creation of a Northern Command that coordinated operations
across the six counties of Northern Ireland.
1981–1989 encompasses the third phase and covers the growing politicization of
the Republican movement which occurred after the Hunger Strikes. In total, ten
Republicans died on hunger strike in 1981; seven were PIRA members. PIRA’s
Bobby Sands had been elected to Westminster after winning a by-election while
on hunger strike. Sympathy for PIRA began to rise again and this was largely chan-
neled toward PIRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, by organizational elites such as
McGuinness, Adams, and Republican strategist and publicist Danny Morrison.
Phase four (1990–1994) covers the negotiations and pathway toward ceasefires
undertaken secretly by organizational elites. Much of this was carried out unbe-
knownst to thewider cadre. Phase five (1995–1998) covers the period inwhich the nego-
tiations were made public and the march toward the final ceasefire and the Good
Friday Agreement that symbolized for many the end of the Northern Ireland conflict.
The PIRA Militant Database
The database contains information on 1240 individuals who were either convicted of
PIRA-related activities (including membership) or died on ‘‘active service,’’ a term
used by PIRA to describe members’ involvement in PIRA-related activities. For
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the purposes of this article, being engaged in ‘‘active service’’ includes both violent
activities (e.g., bombing attacks), and non-violent activities (e.g., training accidents).
The individuals were identified from a number of open-sources: a) statements by the
Irish Republican Army including their annual Roll of Honor which commemorates
their war dead; b) the Belfast Graves publication that offers an account of Republicans
killed in combat;13 c)McKittrick et al.’s Lost Liveswhich provides an obituary of each
civilian and (para-)military victim of the Northern Ireland conflict;14 d) historical
accounts of PIRA from academic sources; and e) newspaper archives.
Once a substantial number of names (300þ) had been identified from these
sources, a team of fourteen coders used the Irish Times newspaper archives to com-
plete the data fields. Each entry of a PIRA member was coded twice to ensure
inter-coder reliability. As each individual was coded, the names of other PIRA mem-
bers within the article were added to our actor dictionary, allowing for future social
network analyses. Upon completion, this information was augmented by information
in the above sources. For each individual the database captures 39 data points. The
information captured includes name, a unique identifier number that anonymizes the
individual so that the database can eventually be made public to other researchers,
alias, gender, highest level of education achieved, organizational affiliation, sub-unit
affiliation, year of birth, age at earliest identifiable paramilitary activity, the phase of
the conflict in which they took part in their first activity, the year of first identifiable
activity, whether they were killed in combat (and if so, their age of death, the year of
death, and the phase of the conflict in which they died), their place of birth (whether it
was North or South of the border, the province, the county, town=village size, urban=
rural), their known address at the time of the activity they were convicted of (whether
it was North or South of the border, the province, the county, town=village size,
urban=rural), marital status, whether they had children (and how many), occupation,
occupation type, positions held within the organization (when they held them and at
what age), years active, arrests,15 prison terms, and attacks linked to.
While the data are sufficiently large, reliable, and dense for the analysis that
follows, some caveats are appropriate. It is not a complete dataset of all PIRA mem-
bers. Such an undertaking would result in a much larger dataset that due to time and
financial constraints would be very difficult to complete. Further, many PIRA mem-
bers may have eluded convictions and hence escaped our data collection protocols.
The observations are also non-random due to the original sources used to build the
actor dictionary. There is no way therefore to estimate the effects that missing obser-
vations have upon the analysis that follows but we feel that the sample size is suffi-
ciently large enough that we can be relatively confident about the robustness of our
findings. Finally, the Irish Times archive is the sole newspaper source used for the
database. For practical (needing access to digitalized newspapers) and financial
reasons, we could not add other newspapers such as the Belfast Telegraph into
our data collection capabilities. Such a source may have added data density to
variables that proved troublesome to consistently collect data on.
Age of First PIRA-Related Activity and Recruitment Policy
The PIRA militant database catalogues the age at which we can confidently identify
the individual’s first act of paramilitary activity. This is not identical to identifying
exactly when the individual joined the group. Given the secretive nature of involve-
ment in terrorist activity, as well as the challenge of disaggregating involvement from
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actual engagement in activity (often synonymous in a legal sense, where membership
constitutes an illegal act)—the specific age of recruitment is unattainable in most cases.
For the vast majority of the individuals in our database, this field encapsulates the age
at which they committed their first PIRA-related activity that led to a conviction. The
outliers to this trend encapsulate those Volunteers who died in action. In these cases,
PIRA’s Publicity Department, through their newspaper An Phoblacht, often released
fine-grained information on when and why the individual joined the group. While
some sources may state that an individual joined the ‘‘Republicanmovement’’ at a cer-
tain age, such a source fails to reach our standards of both a) what constitutes
PIRA-related activity and b) what constitutes activity that may lead to a conviction.
In sum, age of first identifiable PIRA activity is the best that can be captured in this
type of data collection effort short of a major undertaking of primary interviews.
The average age at the time of first identifiable PIRA-related activity that we can
accurately account for is 24.99 years old. On average, female recruits were a year and
a half older than their male counterparts at the time of first PIRA-related activity
(26.56 vs. 24.91). The total average age is very similar to Sageman’s16 findings on
global jihadists who averaged 25.7. The average age however is markedly older than
Florez-Morris’ sample of Colombian militants who averaged 20 years.17 It is also
much younger than the average age of 35 identified by Horgan and Gill in their sam-
ple of dissident Republicans active in Northern Ireland between 1999 and 2010.18
Given the length of time under consideration here, it is perhaps not appropriate
to make these like for like comparisons as the average age is likely to fluctuate across
time because of organizational recruitment policy, tactics, strategies, and the contem-
porary dynamics of the campaign itself. Calculating the average age by phase shows
an interesting pattern in that the average age of new recruits gets older as the cam-
paign of violence progressed (see Table 1). Phase one recruits averaged 22.25, display-
ing a far closer average to Florez-Morris’ sample mentioned above.19 Phases two and
three averaged 25.22 and 26.48 respectively. Phase four averaged 28.13 and phase five
averaged 32.67 (see Table 1). These figures are consistently higher than the average of
those IRA volunteers who died on ‘‘active service’’ (phase one: 21.25, phase two: 24.3,
phase three: 21.23, phase four: 22.77, and phase five: 18.5). Taking into account
Horgan and Gill’s findings on those active post-Good Friday Agreement, we can
see a long historical trajectory of new recruits becoming older and older the longer
the conflict ensued.20 Interestingly, the inverse was found to be true in Reinares’ sam-
ple of ETA militants. Despite ETA and PIRA’s striking similarities in structure and
the nature and length of their conflict, the temporal dynamics of who joined these
militant groupings were totally opposite as their campaigns of violence progressed.
Table 1. Average age at first activity, by phase
Recruitment phase Mean N SD
1969–1976 22.25 478 6.144
1977–1980 25.22 98 6.877
1981–1989 26.48 245 7.595
1990–1994 28.13 140 8.375
1995–1998 32.67 58 12.140
Total 24.99 1019 7.948
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It is a well-established fact that the longer ‘‘The Troubles’’ ensued, the fewer
fatalities PIRA caused.21 Over the course of phase one PIRA caused an average
of 104 deaths each year. This figure dropped phase by phase from 66 in phase
two, to 53 in phase three, to 37 in phase four and 6 in phase five. While organiza-
tional level (e.g., top-down) analyses stress that the growing politicization of the
PIRA movement caused this decrease in fatalities, our analysis offers another com-
patible dimension. From an individual level (e.g., bottom-up) perspective, the older
PIRA recruits became the less likely they were to engage in violent activities that led
to fatalities. This makes sense when we consider that a rich body of work from the
criminology literature illustrates that younger people typically engage in more viol-
ent and illicit activities than older individuals. Alternatively, the increasing age
profile of new recruits may also reflect organizational-level concerns and require-
ments. It is also important to note that these average ages are aggregate sums of
the cadre as a whole and will include leaders and foot soldiers. While leaders typically
tended to be older than the foot soldiers, our analysis shows that the difference in age
between senior figures and new recruits lessened significantly as the conflict pro-
gressed. While leaders are clearly important, they do not directly take part in violent
activities. Instead, their orders diffuse down a chain of command. While younger
people more readily engage in violent activities, the lack of new young recruits (either
through deliberate recruitment policies or through indifference amongst newer gen-
erations toward the Republican movement) certainly constrains the scale and inten-
sity of potential violent campaigns. This finding contains immediate relevance for
not only risk assessments of terrorist groups at an aggregate level but also for measur-
ing the likelihood of a group moving toward collective disengagement.
Importantly, close to two-thirds (64.7%) of the sample were between the ages of
10 and 22 when Bloody Sunday occurred. Just under a quarter (23.8%) of the sample
were at this vulnerable age during the 1981 Hunger Strikes. These two events are
seen by many as the two seminal watershed moments in the Northern Ireland con-
flict that increased passive and active support for PIRA activities. Indeed, Table 2
illustrates that a third of PIRA recruits’ first identifiable activity occurred before
their 21st birthday. Although youth is not necessarily a causative factor in why
people join terrorist movements, there is a high correlation between it and engage-
ment in high-risk activities and is well established as a strong risk factor for involve-
ment in direct terrorist activity.22 The finding that the perpetrators of violent crime
are more likely to be males between 15 and 25 is a statistically robust finding that
remains constant cross-culturally.23 Silke argues that the same factors that allure
Table 2. Age group by recruitment phase cross tabulation
Age
group
1969–1976
(n)
1977–1980
(n)
1981–1989
(n)
1990–1994
(n)
1995–1998
(n) Total (n)
18 17.4% (83) 5.1% (5) 3.7% (9) .7% (1) 0 (0) 9.6% (98)
18–20 34.5% (165) 21.4% (21) 14.4% (35) 15.0% (21) 6.9% (4) 24.1% (246)
21–23 17.4% (83) 22.4% (22) 20.8% (51) 18.6% (26) 17.2% (10) 18.8% (192)
24–26 12.3% (59) 23.5% (23) 22.0% (54) 22.1% (31) 10.3% (6) 16.9% (173)
27–29 6.5% (31) 6.1% (6) 15.1% (37) 10.7% (15) 13.8% (8) 9.5% (97)
30þ 11.9% (57) 21.4% (21) 24.1% (59) 32.9% (46) 51.7% (30) 21.1% (213)
Total 100.0% (478) 100.0% (98) 100.0% (245) 100.0% (140) 100.0% (58) 100.0% (1019)
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young males into illicit activity, including political violence, may include ‘‘higher
impulsivity, higher confidence, greater attraction to risk taking and a need for sta-
tus.’’24 Silke also points toward research that indicates that young men more often
hold positive attitudes concerning revenge. This may be partially reflected in
Table 3 which illustrates the salient effect proximity to the conflict has upon the
age of first identifiable activity and thereby recruitment. The closer in proximity
to the main conflict area (which mainly occurred in the six counties of Northern
Ireland), the younger the new recruit tended to be. This remained fairly consistent
through the five phases under study with two exceptions. Phase 2 recruits from
the North and South share near identical averages. Phase 5 new English-based
operatives are almost three years younger than those operating in Northern Ireland
However, far more young men, who experienced the same socialization in
Northern Ireland, did not join PIRA than those who did. Other factors would there-
fore appear concurrently relevant in why people join politically violent movements.
Most studies on why people join terrorist movements mostly focus upon the
‘‘supply-side’’ of the process and fail to account for the ‘‘demand-side.’’ By focusing
upon the underlying conditions and presumed individual dispositions that create a
large pool of potential recruits, these analyses ignore impediments to membership.
Explaining the process through which organizations recruit is essential. Social move-
ment theorists have long focused upon this issue.25 In essence, social movement the-
orists posit structural availability as being more important than attitudinal affinity to
a cause. A desire to become a PIRA member, therefore, is of little use if the would-be
member does not possess the structural opportunities to join. Quite often,
pre-existing social and=or familial bonds overcome this constraint and facilitate
the recruitment process. Oftentimes, the contemporary recruitment policy or organi-
zational structure can also act as a structural constraint. For example, the large shift
from younger to older recruits is vividly outlined in Table 2. Whereas between
1969–1976, 17.4% of new recruits could be classified as minors, this type of recruit
gradually became scarcer before becoming seemingly extinct between 1995 and
1998. The percentage of those 18–20 also drastically fell 27.6% across the period
under examination. One factor that may account for this is the changing relationship
between PIRA and its youth wing, Na Fianna Eireann. In the early years of the con-
flict, PIRA leaned upon Na Fianna Eireann for early socialization and recruitment:
The purpose of the youth organization . . .was to prepare young men to
progress into the ranks of the IRA at a later stage, so there would have
been a certain amount of education . . . although it wasn’t anything
Table 3. Average age of new recruits by operational location across phase
Location
1969–
1976 (n)
1977–1980
(n)
1981–
1989 (n)
1990–
1994 (n)
1995–
1998 (n) Total (n)
Northern
Ireland
21.79 (348) 24.75 (75) 25.39 (161) 26.52 (83) 31.76 (29) 23.92 (696)
Rep. of
Ireland
22.72 (83) 24.69 (13) 27.19 (57) 29.48 (33) 34.13 (16) 26.12 (202)
Mainland
Britain
26.82 (22) 33.6 (5) 31.33 (9) 33.6 (10) 28.86 (7) 29.77 (53)
Who Were the Volunteers? 441
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:40
 28
 Ju
ly 
20
14
 
comprehensive or it wasn’t very sophisticated. It would have focused very
heavily on the republican tradition within Irish history. . . . [It was] quite
often a source of scouts for the IRA, they would watch the area for local
volunteers, they would inform volunteers if the Brits were in the area,
they would ensure that the area was safe for local volunteers to move
about either individually or with weaponry and they would play a very
peripheral role in some IRA operations.26
Former Na Fianna Eireann and PIRA member Robert McClenaghan elaborates
further:
We were the junior so we would have been out in front looking to see if
there was any British army, looking to see if there was any RUC. The
older volunteers in the IRA—they would have come out and done the
shooting or whatever it was they were involved in. They would have given
the weapons to us and then we would have took the weapons away and
put them into a safe place.27
The recollections of another former PIRA member, Brendan Hughes, concern-
ing PIRA’s recruitment policies in the 1970s, largely confirms our empirical findings.
Following the feud between PIRA and OIRA that largely culminated in March 1971
after a period of intra-communal violence, he asserts that,
There was a major influx of youngsters coming in . . . you had the Fianna
at this time, young kids, from twelve to sixteen, [but] they had to be over
fifteen to be trained in weapons, both Fianna and the Cumann na gCailini
[girl’s version]. They were potential recruits [to the adult IRA]; they did
scouting work, for instance . . . on their way to school.28
As Table 2 suggests, there was a large shift in recruitment patterns toward older
individuals. A key reason for this is the shift in organizational structure outlined
briefly above. The blueprint to this organizational shift was seized in December
1977 when Seamus Twomey, a leading figure in PIRA, was arrested. The documen-
ted, entitled ‘‘Staff Report,’’ outlined the following:
We are burdened with an inefficient infrastructure of commands, bri-
gades, battalions and companies. This old system . . . has to be changed.
We recommend reorganization and remotivation, the building of a new
Irish Republican Army. . . . We must gear ourselves towards Long Term
Armed Struggle based on putting unknown men and new recruits into a
new structure. This new structure shall be a cell system. . . . Na Fianna
Eireann should return to being an underground organization with little
or no public image. They should be educated and organized decisively
to pass into IRA cell structure when of age.29
In other words, one key component of PIRA’s restructuring in 1977 was to mini-
mize the public face and position of a resource that had provided an abundance of new
young recruits for the previous decade. By going underground, it ensured fewer
recruits and therefore a smaller band of new recruits who were minors. This is reflected
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in the drop from 17.4% to 5.1% between phases one and two. As the Republican cam-
paign became more politicized through the workings of Sinn Fein, Na Fianna Eireann
was totally disbanded during the 1990s and replaced with a youth party for Sinn Fein
(Ogra Sinn Fein). The emergence of Ogra Sinn Fein is largely reflected in PIRA’s
recruitment policies (or lack thereof) of minors from 1990 onwards.
Table 2 also illustrates that recruits older than 30 consistently encompassed a
significant number of new recruits, but this reliance became greater across time, cul-
minating in the final phase where over half of newly identified recruits fell into this
age category. It is the shift away from recruiting those under 20 to recruiting those
over 30 that accounts for much of the increased average age illustrated in Table 1.
Gender
There is a long, storied tradition of females active in Irish Republican militancy dat-
ing back to the 1916 rising in Dublin against British rule and the role played by
Cumann na mBan—a female auxiliary paramilitary force dating back to 1914. Our
data suggests that female PIRA recruits remained a minority throughout the North-
ern Ireland conflict (see Table 4). Across the course of the conflict, women account
for approximately one in twenty militants in our database. This could be for a num-
ber of reasons. First, as mentioned above, males are typically more attracted to
high-risk behavior and revenge than females. Second, recruiters typically targeted
males. Third, the typical roles and behaviors that women engaged in within PIRA
tended to be behind-the-scenes support work such as providing cover to male PIRA
volunteers, providing safe houses, acting as couriers (of weapons, explosives, money,
and sometimes just simple information through paper messages), and acting as
look-outs for male operatives.30 For Moloney, Cumann na mBan through the early
1970s acted as the ‘‘IRA equivalent of being stuck in the kitchen and the bedroom;
they carried messages and smuggled weapons and explosives and they nursed
wounded IRA volunteers. They could be useful for gathering intelligence and carry-
ing weapons, but they did very little, if any, actual fighting.’’31 This form of behavior
is unlikely to lead to anywhere near as many convictions (and hence emerge in our
data collection efforts) than other front-line violent activities such as planting or con-
structing IEDs.32 A repeated theme throughout firsthand accounts by male PIRA
militants is that they rarely knew the identities of the females who helped them on
their missions.33 This is not to suggest however, that there were no prominent
females engaged in violent activities.34 Famous examples include sisters Marian
Table 4. Gender density across phase
Recruitment phase
Total (n)Gender
1969–
1976 (n)
1977–
1980 (n)
1981–
1989 (n)
1990–
1994 (n)
1995–
1998 (n)
Gender
Male 94.9% (482) 97.1% (100) 93.7% (253) 95.9% (139) 98.3% (59) 95.1% (1033)
Female 5.1% (26) 2.9% (3) 6.3% (17) 4.1% (6) 1.7% (1) 4.9% (53)
Total 100.0% (508) 100.0% (103) 100.0% (270) 100.0% (145) 100.0% (60) 100.0% (1086)
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and Delours Price who took part in co-ordinated bombings in London in 1973;
Mairead Farrell who was captured in 1976 planting bombs in Dunmurry and later
killed in Gibraltar by the SAS while on another bombing mission in 1988; Martina
Anderson who was convicted in June 1986 of conspiring to cause explosions in
England and is currently a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly; Pauline
Drumm, Pauline O’Kane, and Donna Maguire who were all convicted in German
courts of attempting to murder British soldiers; and Ella O’Dwyer who was con-
victed of conspiracy to commit bombings across England in 1985. In essence many
of the most famous female recruits were foreign operatives. In fact, female recruits
also represented a disproportionate number of activities in mainland England.
12.7% of the operatives that took part in activities in England were female. Not
all of these operatives took part in high-risk behaviors however. Through the late
1970s and 1980s, Cumann na mBan provided at least ten trained couriers who would
pass messages between PIRA elites to the ground-level cell leaders.35
The concentration of women did fluctuate across time however, peaking in the
phase that followed the Hunger Strikes (in which three female militants also took
part).36 During phase one, under Gerry Adams’ leadership, the Belfast Brigade began
recruiting women absent of Cumann na mBan membership.37 This helps account for
the relatively high numbers of women in this phase, especially when we consider phase
one as being the most represented phase in our total database. As a response, the
alienated Cumann na mBan’s leadership refused to take orders from PIRA for a per-
iod of time.38 PIRA’s structural changes account for phase two’s subsequent drop in
numbers. The ‘‘Staff Report’’ alluded to above also mentions the following:
Cumann na mBan [PIRA’s female unit], we propose, should be dissolved
with the best being incorporated in IRA cells structure and the rest going
into Civil and Military administration.39
PIRA’s restructuring in 1977 therefore reduced the front-line role and need for
female recruits and our findings empirically demonstrate this. Although the depth
of female recruits spiked in phase three, this was immediately followed by two per-
iods of decline.
Birth and Operational Location
Two political entities govern the island of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland encom-
passes the twenty-six Southern counties. Northern Ireland (as part of the ‘‘United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’’) covers the six Northern counties
of Derry, Antrim, Armagh, Down, Tyrone, and Fermanagh. The island is also split
into four provinces: Connacht in theWest, Leinster in the East, Munster in the South,
and Ulster in the North. Ulster and Northern Ireland are not coterminous. The six
counties of Northern Ireland all belong to Ulster but so too do three other counties
that are part of the Republic (Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan). See Figure 1.
We have collected data on the birth location of 503 militants (see Table 5). Given
92.8% of the total deaths attributed to the conflict as a whole occurred in the six
counties of Northern Ireland,40 it is unsurprising that the vast majority (82.7%) of
our sample were born there. 13.9% of the sample were born in the Republic of
Ireland while a much smaller number were born in England and the United States.
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Our data are denser when we account for the location the individual inhabited at
the moment we can pinpoint their first PIRA-related activity. This is because current
address is regularly mentioned within newspaper accounts of court proceedings.
Table 6 illustrates that figures for Northern Ireland are 10.5% lower than the birth
location figures while those living in the Republic rise to 21.5% and those living in
England double their proportion.
The question remains however, where in the Republic of Ireland exactly did
these individuals migrate toward? Once we categorize the leap in provincial terms,
Table 5. Birth location
Location Frequency Valid %
Valid
North 416 82.7
South 70 13.9
England 12 2.4
USA 5 1.0
Total 503 100.0
Missing
Unknown 737
Total 1240
Figure 1. Map of Ireland.
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the shift from North to South is not so dramatic as the three border counties of
Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan are characterized as being in Ulster. Horgan and
Taylor also note that PIRA’s Northern Command further included counties Leitrim
and Louth.41 When these two counties are added, the operational figure for PIRA’s
Northern Command rises to 86.8%. In effect, operational members of Northern
Command, upon leaving the Northern six counties, tended to migrate towards other
counties under the auspices of Northern Command.
Typically, those within Southern Command provided logistical support for
Northern command. Prime activities included training, funding, storage, and move-
ment of weaponry and explosives and provision of safehouses.42 A surprisingly small
number of PIRA cadre come from the Southern province of Munster. This is parti-
cularly surprising considering that PIRA possessed approximately 230 safehouses
across the province and that much of the training took part there.43 Again, these
types of activities may be more elusive to the security community and perhaps under-
counts the true number in this area.
Antrim, mainly because of the capital Belfast, is the most represented county in
terms of where the individuals were born (40.3%) and where they were located at the
moment of first PIRA related activity (40.6%). Again, this is not surprising consider-
ing the vast majority of both IED events and deaths occurred here throughout the
period of the conflict. Tyrone is the county with the second highest birth location
of our database with (14.8%), then Derry (13%), Armagh (10.7%), Down (5.1%),
Dublin (2.7%), and Monaghan (2.3%). All of the counties apart from Carlow, Clare,
Kildare, Kilkenny, Offaly, and Roscommon are represented here. Some differences
occur when we focus upon operational county. Derry is the second most represented
county for individual operational location (13.3%), followed by Tyrone (9.5%),
Armagh (7.9%), Dublin (6.8%), Down (4.4%), Louth (4.3%), and Monaghan
(3.5%). All of the counties apart from Carlow and Offaly are represented here (see
Table 7).
Table 8 illustrates the shifting nature of operational location across the five
phases under examination. There is a clear downturn in the number of operatives
active within the Northern six counties the longer the conflict went on. This is largely
explained by the dramatic drop in density amongst Antrim- and Belfast-based opera-
tives from 46.7% in phase two to 27.1% in phase three. In effect, the onset of the
Hunger Strikes and the growing politicization of the movement acted as a scale shift
Table 6. Location at time of conviction=active service death
Location Frequency Valid %
Valid
North 786 72.2
South 234 21.5
England 55 5.1
USA 13 1.2
Total 1088 100.0
Missing
Unknown 152
Total 1240
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Table 7. Birth and operational counties
County Birth county (n) Operational county (n)
Antrim 40.3% (196) 40.6% (414)
Armagh 10.7% (52) 7.9% (80)
Carlow 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0)
Cavan 0.4% (2) 0.2% (2)
Clare 0.0% (0) 0.2% (2)
Cork 0.8% (4) 0.2% (2)
Derry 13.0% (63) 13.3% (136)
Donegal 1.2% (6) 1.8% (18)
Down 5.1% (25) 4.4% (45)
Dublin 2.7% (13) 6.8% (69)
Fermanagh 1.0% (5) 1.2% (12)
Galway 0.2% (1) 0.1% (1)
Kerry 0.8% (4) 0.9% (9)
Kildare 0.0% (0) 0.5% (5)
Kilkenny 0.0% (0) 0.3% (3)
Laois 0.8% (4) 0.1% (1)
Leitrim 0.2% (1) 0.2% (2)
Limerick 0.8% (4) 0.8% (8)
Longford 0.2% (1) 0.2% (2)
Louth 1.6% (8) 4.3% (44)
Mayo 0.4% (2) 0.1% (1)
Meath 0.2% (1) 0.6% (6)
Monaghan 2.3% (11) 3.5% (36)
Offaly 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0)
Roscommon 0.0% (0) 0.2% (2)
Sligo 0.4% (2) 0.3% (3)
Tipperary 0.8% (4) 0.2% (2)
Tyrone 14.8% (72) 9.5% (97)
Waterford 0.2% (1) 0.4% (4)
Westmeath 0.2% (1) 0.2% (2)
Wexford 0.4% (2) 0.1% (1)
Wicklow 0.2% (1) 0.5% (5)
Table 8. Operational location across recruitment phase
Location
1969–
1976 (n)
1977–
1980 (n)
1981–
1989 (n)
1990–
1994 (n)
1995–
1998 (n)
1969–
1998 (n)
North 75.9% (360) 78.8% (78) 70.2% (181) 65.9% (85) 54.7% (29) 72.4% (733)
South 19.2% (91) 14.1% (14) 22.9% (59) 26.4% (34) 32.1% (17) 21.2% (215)
England 4.6% (22) 5.1% (5) 3.5% (9) 7.8% (10) 13.2% (7) 5.2% (53)
USA 0.2% (1) 2.0% (2) 3.5% (9) 1.2% (12)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% (1013)
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away on an aggregate level from operatives embedded in Belfast and Antrim toward
a much higher presence in both County Derry (þ8.7%), and the Republic of Ireland
(8.8%). Membership rates within the Republic continued to expand as the conflict
continued. Interestingly, this process occurred as the leadership and elite level itself
became far more Antrim- and Belfast-centric and moved its base of operations and
regular meetings away from Dublin.44 This also occurred at a time when operational
leaders such as Brendan Hughes noticed a downgrading in the capabilities of North-
ern IRA Brigades and cells to successfully fight against the British.45 The higher
activity within the Republic of Ireland during the phases of negotiations with the
British (both secret and open) may also reflect a growing dissension amongst the
Southern cadre in the peace process. This dynamic continues with contemporary dis-
sident groupings whose older members generally tend to be from the Republic also.46
This assertion is further strengthened when we see that places like Dublin, Armagh,
Louth, and Tyrone,47 four hubs of contemporary dissident recruitment, witnessed
the largest spikes in overall density between phase one and phase five. In effect, much
of the internal factions within PIRA through the 1970s concerned having a largely
Southern-based leadership who alienated the majority Northern-based cadre. From
the onset of the politicization of the Republican movement, we see a largely
Belfast-based leadership leading to the alienation of Southern-, Tyrone-, and
Armagh-based cadre.
Town Size
Census records are freely available from both the Central Statistics Office in the
Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. City,
town, and village populations for 1971, 1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996 are available for
the Republic of Ireland. The same statistics are available for 1971, 1981, and 1991 for
Northern Ireland. This allows for an analysis of the town sizes PIRA members typi-
cally operated in. For those individuals we could confidently assert a known address
at time of first identifiable PIRA-related activity, we used the closest census record.
For example, if a member was born in Belfast in 1978, the 1981 census records were
used to calculate town size. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the aggregated results.
Just over one third of our sample of 979 militants operated in a city with a
Table 9. Operational town size
Town size Frequency Valid % Cumulative %
Valid
Under 2,000 140 14.3 14.3
2,000 to 10,000 243 24.8 39.1
10,001 to 50,000 139 14.2 53.3
50,001 to 100,000 123 12.6 65.9
Over 100,000 334 34.1 100.0
Total 979 100.0
Missing
Unknown 261
Total 1240
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population over 100,000. A further quarter of the sample operated in towns with a
population of between 2,000 and 10,000. The findings serve as further empirical
demonstration that PIRA was largely an urban-based organization.48 It also largely
reflects research on the geography of guerrilla warfare, which demonstrates that con-
temporary guerrilla fighters are more likely to operate in urban areas because of the
comparative advantages that occur with high population densities.49
There is an inverse relationship between town size and operational location
depending upon whether the recruit operated in Northern Ireland or the Republic
of Ireland. Recruits based in the Republic of Ireland are much more likely to be
based in smaller villages and towns and much less likely to be based in bigger towns
and cities than their Northern colleagues. Much of this can be accounted for by
Belfast, which is the only city in Northern Ireland with a population greater than
100,000 during the time period under consideration here. See Table 10.
The town sizes operatives were based in also changed a number of times across
the phases of the Northern Ireland conflict. First, following PIRA’s reorganization,
there is a spike in the number of recruits based in villages and small towns with
populations under 2,000. This phase saw the proportion of recruits in these areas
increase by 250%. As mentioned previously, PIRA’s re-structuring led to 465 fewer
charges for paramilitary offences occurring within a year.50 The re-structuring how-
ever did not occur nationwide. Instead, the Staff Report, which suggested these
changes, only applied to command areas based in towns and cities. ‘‘Rural areas,
we decided, should be treated as separate cases to that of city and town Brigade=
Command areas. For this reason our proposals will affect mainly city and town
areas, where the majority of our operations are carried out, and where the biggest
proportion of our support lies anyway.’’51 This change may have been a product
of an independent spirit amongst PIRA cadre in the countryside. It may also have
been a reaction to the urban-based leadership of Adams (Belfast) and McGuinness
(Derry).52 Regardless of the reasons why, the outcome of the re-structuring made the
capture, arrest, and conviction of urban-based (particularly those in towns with a
population of 2000–50,000) cadre less likely. It consequently increased the likelihood
for those based in rural areas and hence the spike within our dataset. In other words,
this particular spike is not a product of a shifting recruitment and operational prac-
tice but rather the product of tighter, more disciplined urban units whose cadre were
less likely to be convicted and hence end up in our database. The large fall in num-
bers from those based in cities over 100,000 people from 1981 onwards is discussed
above in relation to the narrowing numbers of Belfast-based militants at the expense
of those based in Derry, large Dublin towns, and elsewhere. See Table 11.
Table 10. Operational town size by country
Town size N. Ireland Rep. of Ireland
Under 2,000 (n) 11.1% (85) 26.8% (55)
2,000 to 10,000 (n) 24.8% (191) 25.4% (52)
10,001 to 50,000 (n) 9.8% (75) 31.2% (64)
50,001 to 100,000 (n) 15.0% (115) 3.4% (7)
Over 100,000 (n) 39.4% (303) 13.2% (27)
Total (n) 100.0% (769) 100.0% (205)
Who Were the Volunteers? 449
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:40
 28
 Ju
ly 
20
14
 
Table 12 illustrates that the larger the town size, the greater the proportion of
women operating there. When we consider the large support role most female mem-
bers played within PIRA, it is no surprise to find them more readily in areas where
the vast majority of combat took place; e.g., the cities of Belfast and Derry are both
at the larger end of the population scale.
Marriage and Family
The database also captures marital (n¼ 536) and family status (n¼ 425) information.
41.6% were married (either at the time of recruitment or during their PIRA career)
and a similar figure of 41.4% have children. There may be somewhat of a reporting
bias here. The fact a recruit is married is more likely to be reported and hence picked
up by our data collection efforts. This problem is shared however by similar types of
studies so comparisons are valid. The figure is comparatively high compared to ETA
at 11.6%,53 Pakistani militants at 14%,54 comparable with contemporary dissident
Irish Republicans55 whose married cadre number just over 50% and much less than
Table 11. Operational town size by recruitment phase
Total
Town size 1969–1976 1977–1980 1981–1989 1990–1994 1995–1998
Under
2,000 (n)
10.1% (44) 25.0% (23) 18.2% (42) 13.5% (15) 21.7% (10)
2,000 to
10,000 (n)
28.3% (123) 18.5% (17) 20.3% (47) 27.9% (31) 30.4% (14)
10,001 to
50,000 (n)
13.8% (60) 6.5% (6) 14.7% (34) 17.1% (19) 15.2% (7)
50,001 to
100,000 (n)
6.9% (30) 10.9% (10) 23.8% (55) 12.6% (14) 8.7% (4)
Over
100,000 (n)
40.8% (177) 39.1% (36) 22.9% (53) 28.8% (32) 23.9% (11)
Total (n) 100.0% (434) 100.0% (92) 100.0% (231) 100.0% (111) 100.0% (46)
Table 12. Town size gender crosstabulation
% Within town size
Gender
TotalMale Female
Town size
Under 2,000 (n) 98.6% (138) 1.4% (2) 100.0% (140)
2,000 to 10,000 (n) 97.9% (238) 2.1% (5) 100.0% (243)
10,001 to 50,000 (n) 97.1% (135) 2.9% (4) 100.0% (139)
50,001 to 100,000 (n) 93.5% (115) 6.5% (8) 100.0% (123)
Over 100,000 (n) 93.4% (312) 6.6% (22) 100.0% (334)
Total (n) 95.8% (938) 4.2% (41) 100.0% (979)
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Sageman’s sample of global Jihadis at 73%.56 Of the PIRA sample, those from the
North were less likely to be married (37.2%) compared to their Southern (51.9%)
and English-based operatives (52.6%). There is no link between the rising recruit-
ment age and the marriage levels across the five phases. 39.8% of phase one recruits
were married compared to 35.3% of phase five recruits. The rising age of the cadre
however has an expected relationship with the propensity to have children. Whereas
35.8% of the cadre in phase one had children, this figure rose to 58.3% in phase five.
The large numbers of married PIRA members is perhaps not surprising. White
and White’s exemplary study On the Resources of Urban Guerrillas57 analyses the
effects of marriage on career length and effectiveness of 67 deceased Belfast-based
PIRA members. The analysis shows that married members have longer career
lengths (avg. of 16 months longer) and the authors argue that this is because of
the greater interpersonal resources that marriage entails, which in turn provide
resources such as emotional support and provision of safe houses. Atran’s study
of contemporary militants in Indonesia came to the same conclusion.58
Occupation
We have data on the occupation type of 422 of the observations in our dataset. Mem-
bers vary across a broad spectrum of occupation types. Construction accounts for
over a third of this sample (35.7%). Of those in construction, 61% were in specialist
positions such as electricians, engineers, plasterers, and carpenters compared to the
rest, who were laborers and handymen. Given the skills required in bomb-making,
this is perhaps unsurprising and may be driven by a selection effect. Recruiters care-
fully choose who can join the organization and at times there could be a skill-based
recruitment drive.59 A further 27.7% worked in the services=industrial industries
(specialist 11.6%, non-specialist 16.1%). Those unemployed encompass the third
highest category at 11.4%. A number of our categories overlap with Reinares’
categorizations of his ETA sample.60 As well as construction, PIRAmembers are also
far more likely to be unemployed (11.4% vs. 0.6%), and less likely to be students (2.8%
vs. 16.2%), a professional or in the services=industrial sector (34.6% vs. 59%), or in
clerical, administration or sales (6.9% vs. 21%) than their ETA counterparts.
PIRA cadre active in the occupied six counties were more likely to be in the
non-specialized services=industrial sector (18.3% vs. 11.5%) and non-specialized
construction (16.7% vs. 11.5%) than their Southern-based colleagues and less likely
to be professionals (3.5% vs. 9.6%), unemployed (11.3% vs. 15.4%), or involved
in agriculture (3.5% vs. 8.7%). Those active in England however are evenly spread
across most of the categories and far less likely to be involved in construction
(25%) compared to those active on the island of Ireland.
Roles
Both the empirical and theoretical investigations of roles within terrorist movements
remain overlooked. Typically studies on who joins a terrorist group tend to suffer
from a categorization error. By aggregating all actors to the label ‘‘terrorist,’’ they
miss many of the key differences within the sample that may come to light if some
form of disaggregation in role types is deployed. The PIRA militant database
captures information on the age at which the individual first took part in any
number of illicit activities. This was not possible for all of our militants as many were
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just convicted of either being a member of a paramilitary organization or possession
of materials. The main recurring categories were gunman, bomber, criminal activities
(including hijackings, bank robberies, kidnappings, and drug dealing), bomb-maker,
and gunrunner. Role types are not mutually exclusive. If for example an individual
engaged in a shooting and bombing attack (at the same time or at different stages in
his=her PIRA career), the individual was coded as both. The results below suggest
there is a clear disparity in the age at which individuals are likely to first engage
in certain types of terrorist activity. For example, there is a four-year age gap
between the average age of first conviction for a violent offence compared to the
average age of first conviction for a non-violent or support role activity. This pattern
holds true across all five phases of the conflict. It is perhaps not surprising therefore
to find individuals convicted of shootings (24) and planting bombs (24.13) at the
lower end of the average age spectrum. Those convicted of criminal activities average
a slighter higher age (26.64) while bomb-makers (29.64) and gunrunners (33.16) are
typically much older than the individuals engaged in proximal violent activities such
as planting IEDs and shooting incidents. Bomb-makers were consistently older than
bombers across each of the five phases. The disparity in age also got wider across
time; in phase one the gap was two years whereas by phase five the gap was twelve.
While the average age of first-time activity for the sample as a whole increased by ten
years from phase one to phase five, the average age of bombers only rose by four
years, which suggests the profile of those engaged in this type of activity changed
very little across time. The average age of bomb-makers on the other hand increased
by fourteen years from phase one to five. See Table 13.
The discussion above concerning youth and proclivity to engage in violence is
even more important here when we consider that the older the recruit becomes,
the less likely the recruit is to be engaged in front-line violent activities. The results
also suggest that the career trajectories and role migration of individual members of
terrorist groups should be examined more closely. While this type of study is
currently flourishing in the criminology field, it remains unexplored in relation to
terrorism and political violence with one exception.61
There are other considerable differences between role types. 8.7% of those in
engaged in planting bombs were women, at least double the density of each of the
other role types under consideration here. This is likely to be the case because women
could transport bombs in their clothing, in prams, or as part of a couple in order to
arouse less suspicion from the police and security services. The density of bombers
recruited by phase closely mirrors the scale of bombings across the five phases.
Table 13. Average age by role type
Item N Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Gunrunner age 38 20 65 33.16 9.263
Bomb-maker age 83 16 54 29.64 8.678
Age of non-violent activity 190 16 70 28.67 9.033
Criminal offence age 139 16 54 26.64 7.560
Age at first violent offence 645 13 54 24.56 6.394
Bomber age 321 13 49 24.13 6.280
Gunman age 274 15 44 24.00 4.991
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62.2% of the gunrunners’ first activities took place in phase three, directly following
the Hunger Strikes, which is more than double the density for this phase than any of
the other role types. This can be largely traced to the intended replication of the ‘‘Tet
Offensive’’ tactics that was to take place during this time.62 Those engaged in crimi-
nal activities and gunrunning were more likely to be operational outside of the occu-
pied six counties, particularly in the border county of Co. Louth. These individuals
were also far less likely to be married and have children compared to those engaged
in violent activities like bombings and shootings.
In sum, these findings suggest that researchers have used the incorrect dependent
variable when analyzing who joins terrorist organizations. Instead of who becomes a
terrorist, the more pertinent question may be who becomes a bomb-maker as
opposed to a gunman and so on. The results suggest a need to explore the issue of
role-specific terrorist profiles in more depth. To illustrate, McFate63 argues that it
is imperative for researchers to examine the broader social environment in which
bombs are ‘‘invented, manufactured, distributed and used.’’ This is mainly because
improvised explosive devices are a product of human social organization. The indi-
vidual planting a roadside bomb is often only the final node in a network of multiple
actors fulfilling different role types. Each role type encompasses a specific number of
functions for the IED to be created. Shifting our analytical gaze from ‘‘bomb’’ to
‘‘bomb-maker’’ (and bomb-maker affiliates such as component carriers, component
procurer, component-storer, and IED transporters, etc.) should provide further
insight into understanding how terrorist groups operate on the ground, how they
are structured, and the typical antecedent behaviors that occur pre-attack.64
Conclusion
The database under analysis here will provide the basis of a fruitful research agenda.
This article simply provided a descriptive analysis of our findings, but further
research from this database will include social network analyses of particular PIRA
Brigades and of the group as a whole across time, inferential investigations of
role-specific terrorist profiles, a Brigade-level analysis on the capacity for creativity,
and issues concerning recidivism and disengagement from militant groups.
This article provided the first systematic and holistic analysis of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army at the individual level of analysis. Methodologically, the arti-
cle demonstrates that such large-N analyses are possible given the availability of
resources and appropriate case selection. The research findings also demonstrate
the necessity of such endeavors. While much of American political science treats
the analysis of terrorism and political violence at the event level, this article demon-
strates the utility of a much more fine-grained micro-level approach. While dynamics
such as counter-terrorism events and system-level variables are important in explain-
ing the scale and intensity of non-state political violence, such analyses are incom-
plete without an additional focus on micro-level factors such as the scale and
intensity of recruitment patterns and the constituent geographic and sociological
recruitment patterns that accompany them. Micro-level approaches provide one
strong means with which we can understand the key social, psychological, and
cultural dynamics that underpin the broader processes that mobilize, characterize,
and maintain any type of non-state political violence.65 A broader consequence of
this lack of focus on micro-level issues to date is that much academic work on
terrorism remains irrelevant for counter-terrorism practitioners and operators.
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The findings in this article also provide relevant insight for the dynamics of con-
temporary groups. The older the cadre became, the less violent and more prone
towards peaceful initiatives it also became. The surge in recruitment in particular
geographic areas towards the ceasefire also may have provided a forewarning of
what particular areas dissidents and splits were likely to emerge from. While cham-
pioning the cause of micro-level analyses, this article has also pinpointed a number
of sub-fields that warrant attention, in particular issues concerning role types and the
profile of individuals who engage in them.
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